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Abstract: This paper explores how central banks have come to be ‘independent’, and 
the nature of their relationship to the democratic process.  We critically assess the 
standard debates about transparency  and accountability, arguing that much of this 
discussion misses the fundamental changes that are occurring in policymaking  practice, 
which render technocratic debates about the nature of disclosure and independence 
somewhat redundant. We explore these issues through an Australian example. The 
nature of central bankers’ evolving responsibilities and the continuing perceived need 
for discretion, if not secrecy, potentially undercut democratic processes and raise issues 
of more general significance for independent central banks everywhere. 
 
Introduction 
The idea that central banks should be independent has rapidly become the 
conventional wisdom in many of the world’s democracies. The standard argument 
derived from rational choice theory that frames much of the central bank literature 
suggests that monetary policy is simply too important to be subject to the allegedly 
self-serving, short-term calculations of politicians who cannot be trusted to put the 
‘national interest’ ahead of their own. The potentially anti-democratic implications of 
actually operationalising such views and delegating responsibility to un-elected 
technocrats have also been widely noted in the literature on central banking.1 The 
justification for such a potentially undemocratic innovation has been that that a key 
area of public policy will be less politicized (and by implication more effective), and 
that the central banks themselves will be held strictly accountable for their actions. In 
reality, however, this implicit trade-off has only been partially realized. The nature of 
the policy mechanics of central banking and the uncertainty surrounding it has created 
institutional incentives that have encouraged central bankers to adopt various forms of 
non-transparency. This has not been widely recognized as much of the existing 
literature on transparency and central bank independence (CBI) has operated at a 
rather superficial, ‘first order’ level, and failed to identify the more profound changes 
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that are occurring at a deeper paradigmatic level, as central bankers feel compelled to 
re-think their basic approach to policy-making and their relationship with the public. 
Although the new politics of  CBI has created strong pressures for greater 
accountability and disclosure, and while improvements on this front have occurred, 
parallel and contrary movements have also taken place.  We argue in this paper that a 
‘new politics of ambiguity’ has developed and has been driven by policy failures and 
uncertainties and the institutional incentives for non-disclosure they create.  We 
explain how this process has evolved and why this has made central bankers less than 
fully transparent and accountable through an examination of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA). 
 
The RBA has been at the forefront of both the practical expansion of central 
bank powers and of the limited debate that has accompanied its continuing ‘mission 
adaptation’, as it has been forced to accommodate new factors that affect its original 
regulatory ambit and principal inflation-controlling mission.  There are a number of 
reasons to be concerned about this evolving role.  Firstly, the benefits of the implicit 
trade-off between enhanced technical competence and efficiency on the one hand, and 
diminished accountability via independence on the other, is unproven: not only is the 
case for central bank independence debatable on ‘technical’ grounds, but the idea that 
central banks are insulated from particular interests (and thus ‘depoliticized’) is 
spurious.  Secondly, and more importantly, the nature of monetary policy 
management precludes the sort of transparency that ought to be a central part of 
accountable public institutions. There is a tension between central banks’ need for 
accountability to legitimate their delegated authority on the one hand, and an 
institutional incentive for less than full disclosure on the other. 
  
This paper explores a number of issues. First, we explain how central banks 
have come to be ‘independent’, and the nature of their relationship to the democratic 
process. Second, we critically assess the standard debates about transparency  and 
accountability, arguing that much of this discussion misses the fundamental changes 
that are occurring in policymaking practice, which render technocratic debates about 
the nature of disclosure and independence somewhat redundant. We explore these 
issues through an Australian example. But the RBA’s place at the forefront of policy 
innovation means this is a case study with great relevance to unfolding debates in 
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Europe and North America, where similar issues are becoming more important and 
contentious. As we shall see, the nature of central bankers evolving responsibilities 
and the continuing perceived need for discretion, if not secrecy, potentially undercut 
democratic processes and raise issues of more general significance for independent 
central banks everywhere. 
 
The Rise of Central Bank Independence 
 
Central bank independence is always a relative concept because it is 
governments which create such institutions. Central banks, even ‘independent’ ones, 
are always ultimately subordinate to government mandate.  As MacLaury  observes, it 
is useful to think of central banks as ‘independent within the government, not 
independent of the government’.2  In this context, CBI can be defined as the 
institutional capacity – usually derived from an institutional mandate, backed by 
government support - to conduct monetary policy free from significant government 
input or ‘meddling’.  Governments may establish the broad goals of policy, or the 
‘rules of the game’ (typically through legislation or through a periodic policy remit), 
but an independent central bank will be free to conduct ongoing policy – actually 
‘playing the game’ - within this framework as it sees fit.  This is sometimes referred 
to as ‘instrument independence’, and these days it typically refers to discretionary 
control over official interest rate setting.  It is this behavioural aspect of independence 
- the discretionary control over policy free from government interference - which is 
by far the most important criteria for judging central bank independence. 
 
The global debate on CBI began in the late 1980s.  By the early 1990s the 
merits of central bank independence had become widely accepted amongst political 
elites in many OECD countries, and within the increasingly powerful international 
financial sector. It is important to recognise that a number of important, long-run 
structural and ideational changes associated with ‘globalisation’ led to the exponential 
growth of money markets, the increased influence of credit ratings agencies, and the 
dominance of a policy paradigm associated with the ‘Washington consensus’. These 
changes were explicitly promoted by powerful inter-governmental agencies like the 
International Monetary Fund, but more subtly advanced by an influential, 
transnational epistemic community of policy entrepreneurs, central bankers, 
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technocrats and public officials.3 Australian policymakers played and early and 
prominent role in accelerating this transformation of the dominant economic paradigm 
in which market forces and ultimately ‘independent’ institutions would be central 
components of an increasingly neoliberal order.  
 
Nevertheless, in Australia as elsewhere, the merits of financial sector 
liberalisation were couched in terms of national benefits. The specialist nature of the 
issues surrounding CBI meant that in Australia prior to 1989 the debate on central 
bank independence was muted. When the debate subsequently  began in earnest, it 
was led by a coalition of conservative Liberal-National parties, then in Opposition,   
with the support of the financial community.  The RBA supported the cause of greater 
independence and by the early to mid-1990s had achieved operational independence 
and control over the instruments of monetary policy.4  Since the late 1980s, other 
countries, such as France, New Zealand and the UK, have all made high profile 
legislative choices to formally grant policy-making independence to their central 
banks.  Similarly, the European Central Bank is now one of the most independent 
central banks in the world and is not accountable to any single European government.  
Spurred by financial crises, Russia, the transition economies of Eastern Europe and a 
number of countries in East Asia and Latin America have taken similar steps towards 
CBI.  Indeed, Maxfield cites 30 cases in the 1990s where national governments have 
legislated to increase the statutory independence of their central banks.5 
 
Rationales for Central Bank Independence 
 
At a technical level, economists have marshalled a number of theoretical and 
empirical arguments in building the case for CBI.  In essence, the theoretical 
arguments are that (1) inflation at virtually any level is bad for the economy (2) over 
the medium to long-term, macroeconomic policy is mainly only capable of managing 
one thing: inflation (3) central banks, not governments, are most likely to pursue a 
low inflation agenda, and (4) there is empirical support for the proposition that there 
is an association between independent central banks and low inflation.  There is an 
extensive specialist literature revolving around these claims,6 but the important point 
to emphasise for the purposes of our discussion is that they are all contested, and 
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empirical support is partial at best. What is of more importance here is the politics that 
surrounds these debates. 
 
One way to think about CBI is to see it as an example of ‘new governance’, 
where emphasis is placed on government policy devolution and power sharing with 
other institutions.  CBI can also be seen as recourse to institutional arrangements 
involving ‘non-majoritarian’ forms of governance, involving, for example, court 
rulings, devolving policy making to independent regulatory agencies or even passing 
policy authority up to supranational institutions.  Governments have adopted such 
arrangements because, according to the standard arguments, they believe that policy 
effectiveness might be enhanced; because independent non-majoritarian institutions 
are seen as better able to harness expertise; because they are more timely in making 
decisions; because they are more shielded from the hurly burly of partisan politics; or 
because they are better placed to take a longer term view of policy.  There is also the 
potential for highly damaging policy errors in the field of monetary policy (eg. a 
policy induced recession); in such circumstances an independent central bank 
provides a ready vehicle for the government for the purposes of scapegoating.  CBI is 
strongly endorsed by the domestic and international financial community and is 
thought by some to add ‘credibility’ to monetary policy.  For all of these reasons 
many governments have devolved monetary policy responsibility to their central 
banks. 
 
In Australia during the 1980s, the RBA gained a more prominent role in 
monetary policy largely for technical reasons.  Domestic financial deregulation in the 
early 1980s meant the effective abolition of all the former instruments of monetary 
policy except for the manipulation of the overnight cash rate, an instrument directly 
controlled by the RBA.  Subsequently the RBA asserted and was granted 
independence (somewhat ironically) during the monetary policy induced recession of 
the early 1990s.7  Amidst this recession, and given the apparent travails of monetary 
policy, the federal government began to see the idea of off-loading monetary 
responsibility to the RBA as an attractive idea.  As the journalist, Paul Kelly, writes, 
‘independence was a gift under duress from the politicians who felt, post recession, 
that distance from the interest rate levers wasn’t such a bad option.’8   Two major 
developments thus marked monetary policy and the role of the RBA in the 1980s and 
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1990s:  the RBA’s role in monetary policy became much more prominent, and the 
government moved to grant it policy independence.  Never before had the RBA 
wielded such policy authority. 
 
Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability 
 
Granting day to day control over what has become the central instrument of 
macroeconomic policy to unelected central bank technocrats is a substantial 
devolution of authority. Accordingly, issues of ‘democratic deficit’ and accountability 
have become more pertinent.  As former (1989-96) RBA governor, Bernie Fraser, has 
argued, ‘as a central bank becomes more independent, it needs to be more accountable 
for its actions’.9  Effective accountability, in short, is the foundation of any legitimacy 
an independent central bank may have in a democracy. As Verdun argues, ‘normal 
democratic governance’, where power holders are directly accountable to the 
electorate, can be complemented by ‘non-majoritarian modes of governance’; if they 
are, ‘properly accountable, non-majoritarian modes of governance can be fully 
legitimate’.10 
 
And yet, central banks have been traditionally closed and secretive 
organisations. They have shrouded their activities with a kind of protective, 
authoritative, secretive mystique, born of their arcane skills and knowledge and their 
close links with governments and the financial community.  Former RBA Governor, 
Bob Johnston, says that the traditional central banker’s view was to ‘never justify and 
never explain the Bank’s activities’.11 
 
CBI suggests the need to radically change such behaviour.  Former Vice 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Blinder, has been an influential 
advocate of central bank independence and in addressing important democratic 
legitimacy criteria pertaining to CBI, he presents five answers to the question; ‘how 
can an independent central bank be rationalised within the context of democratic 
government?’12  First, CBI can be thought of as a piece of ‘constitutional’ engineering 
designed by governments which choose to delegate policy authority because they 
believe it will help them attain their goals more effectively.  In any case, making a 
central bank independent is a governmental or legislative choice and - in principle, at 
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least - reversible.13  Second, the bank’s leaders should be politically appointed and 
have their authority formally delegated by elected representatives.  Third, 
governments should set the bank’s goals.  Fourth, governments should be able to 
override the central bank in extreme cases.  Fifth, central banks must turn something 
of a corner and become open more open and transparent.  
 
The first three of Blinder’s principles have always more or less applied to the 
RBA: the Bank’s independence amounts to a formal delegation of authority from the 
government, the RBA’s leaders are politically appointed, and the government has set 
the Bank’s goals (though only broadly).  The fourth principle, the override provision, 
was added by the Chifley government in the 1940s,14 whilst the fifth principle slowly 
emerged, especially in the 1990s, as the RBA become more open and transparent.  For 
example, the RBA began to publicly announce policy changes in 1989 and issued an 
accompanying press release explaining them.  The Bank’s Governor began appearing 
before a parliamentary committee annually in 1991, and bi-annually from 1996, as 
part of the process of greater openness and disclosure.  The Bank’s leaders have also 
given an increasing flow of speeches and papers explaining the Bank’s thinking and 
policy.  The Bank’s Annual Reports have become more informative and the Bank now 
releases a quarterly Statement on Monetary Policy.  Overall, the RBA now prides 
itself on being on of the most accountable and transparent central banks in the world.  
 
This apparently sanguine conclusion, however, needs to be approached 
critically.  Indeed, there are a range of institutional reasons that mean central bankers 
are  not fully accountable or transparent.  It is useful at this juncture to make an 
analytical distinction between accountability and transparency.15 Although 
accountability and transparency are clearly linked in practice, we can define 
accountability as pertaining to ‘deeds’, especially regarding the extent to which the 
central bank’s policy performance conforms to the mandated goals the bank is 
supposed to be achieving.  To quote the European Central Bank’s Ottmar Issing, 
accountability means ‘we do what we are supposed to do’.16   
Transparency (or disclosure) by contrast is more about ‘words’ and the flow of 
information from the central bank to key audiences, such as the government, the 
public or the financial markets.  Accountability and transparency are linked in that a 
lack of transparency (especially about deeds) implies the clouding of accountability, 
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although it is also the case that a formally accountable central bank might be less than 
fully transparent. Even though central banks’ statutes may enshrine formal 
accountability to governments, this does not ensure such accountability, nor should it 
be confused with transparency. The imprecise, technocratic nature of the policy-
making process - in which even central bankers cannot have complete knowledge of 
economic conditions and prospects – when coupled with the inherent limits of 
linguistic communication,  mean that the essence of transparency, i.e., ‘genuine 
understanding and successful communication’,  can only ever be partial.17 This is 
especially the case when either banks need to avoid creating moral hazard in financial 
markets by being ‘too clear’ and effectively short-circuiting the independent 
judgement of market participants themselves, or when the very nature of emerging 
problems means that banks cannot be candid about problems they are uncertain how 
to manage. The case of the RBA illustrates how its leaders have faced strong 
institutional incentives not to be fully accountable or transparent as a consequence of 
such contradictory pressures.   
 
The Politics of Ambiguity and the Limits of Transparency and Accountability 
 
The creed of expertise and arcane knowledge surrounding central bankers 
belies the fact that one the distinguishing features of monetary policy has been the 
high level of debate about policy paradigms and the high level of uncertainty 
attending the practical application of policy.  Moreover, the economic and political 
fallout attending serious monetary policy miscalculations can be huge.  Hence, the 
tension between the need for accountability and transparency on the one hand, and the 
perceived need for discretion, indeed obfuscation, on the other, has been apparent in 
monetary policy and the world of central banking.  It has underpinned the evolution of 
RBA policy since at least the 1970s.18  Despite broadly addressing the sorts of formal 
legitimacy criteria Blinder identifies above, the uncertainties, the technical challenges 
and the political context confronting central bankers has meant that the studied art of 
policy ambiguity has become institutionally embedded at the RBA, both before and 
after the arrival of CBI in Australia.   
 
Ambiguity, for obvious reasons, is the enemy of both transparency and 
accountability.  Below we identify four forms of policy ambiguity practiced by 
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Australian monetary authorities since the 1970s: technical ambiguity (ambiguity 
relating to ‘technical’ issues of policy calibration and uncertainty regarding policy 
settings and effects); paradigmatic ambiguity (derived from a lack of a coherent 
policy paradigm or clashing paradigms); goal ambiguity (relating to uncertain or 
clashing goals); and political ambiguity (ambiguity as a form of obfuscation serving 
institutional or political interests).   
 
In recent years the issue of technical ambiguity has been discussed amongst 
monetary economists and central bakers under rubric about ‘optimal disclosure’ (or 
optimal ambiguity!) in the making of monetary policy.   The focus is largely on 
technical parameters (eg. whether the central bank should disclose its output forecasts 
or its projections of the path for policy interest rates).  These are parameters at the 
level of what Peter Hall has called ‘first order’ policy dynamics; focusing essentially 
on technical parameters and routine policy adjustments of given policy instruments.19  
A consensus seems to be emerging that ‘transparency can go too’ far, to quote 
Frederic Mishkin.20  Flagging policy objectives too far in advance may undermine a 
central bank’s credibility in the eyes of the public if changing economic 
circumstances force a concomitant change in policy priorities. There is, of course, the 
additional problem of whether the public can take an informed view about the relative 
merits of highly technical policy debates even if the rationales for such policies are 
detailed. The Economist has recently argued that too much openness may actually be 
dangerous: ‘excessive’ transparency and market guidance may encourage ‘moral 
hazard’, risk-taking and a lack of due diligence on the part of market participants.21 
This dilemma has been debated in  Europe, where the credibility of European Central 
Bank (ECB) with both the public and European policymakers has hinged on its ability 
to be both accountable and transparent. The ECB’s problems are compounded by the 
fact that Europe encompasses very different, ultimately normative, ‘liberal’ and 
‘continental’ views about the merits of transparency, which respectively favour 
greater openness and greater control of information by institutional authorities.22 
 
In contrast to the predominantly first order European and North American 
debates, we are primarily concerned with larger scale policy changes, or what Peter 
Hall has called ‘third order’ policy dynamics. Third order dynamics refer to 
paradigmatic shifts in understandings and policy orientations of a sort that occurred in 
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the transition from Keynesianism to monetarism.23 At such moments, the broad 
frameworks of policy change and the dynamics of shifting policy paradigms generate 
conflicts or uncertainty regarding policy goals.   
 
Paradigmatic change at the RBA 
 
We begin our empirical analysis with the formal adoption of a monetarism at 
the RBA in 1976.  Monetarism and the practice of monetary targeting in this period 
did evince a degree of paradigmatic clarity – monetarism was the official policy 
paradigm.  However, the decade long attempt to make monetary targeting work via 
regulating the money supply in order to reduce inflation is best read as a case study in 
both technical and political ambiguity.  The former was manifest in the highly 
uncertain empirical link in the theorised relationship between the money supply and 
inflation outcomes.  This became even more serious from the early 1980s as the 
effects of financial deregulation began to almost completely dissolve the theorised 
relationship between the money supply and inflation outcomes.  
 
There was also ambiguity over goals.  Monetary policy itself was focused on 
‘fighting inflation first’, but in practice this effort encountered contradictory goals and 
priorities.  The relevant ‘monetary authorities’ during this period were located in both 
the Bank and the government and the goal of restraining the money supply soon 
began to run counter to other government agendas.   In particular, the RBA had 
difficulty in persuading the government to take measures – such as reducing the 
budget deficit, increasing interest rates and re-valuing the exchange rate – that would 
have facilitated the achievement of the monetary targets. 24  Consequently none of the 
annual targets were achieved and little progress was made in systematically winding 
back inflation.   
 
Political ambiguity is apparent in this period, especially due to the fact that 
what was later to be called the ‘failed dogma of monetarism’ was persisted with for so 
long.25  The authorities persisted with the ambiguity and limited achievements of the 
monetarist regime because the strategy had formed the centre piece of the 
government’s economic strategy, and, as the definitive account by Guttmann points 
out, ‘an alternative approach for structuring monetary policy, let alone one that was 
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credible, was absent’.26  The government had a policy regime that did not work but 
was afraid to jettison it.  Monetary targeting was still in vogue internationally; the 
financial markets liked targeting and the government was unwilling to antagonise 
them.27  The markets were favourably disposed to targeting because it implied policy 
discipline by the government and because the target was thought to be a useful way of 
reading the RBA’s policy stance.  Neither of these views were correct.  Monetarism 
and monetary targeting were finally abandoned in 1985 as the manifest failure of the 
policy paradigm became blindingly obvious and as the original benefits of political 
ambiguity diminished. 
 
The authorities then ventured further in the ‘monetary policy wilderness’28 by 
adopting the hastily contrived ‘checklist’ approach in the latter part of the 1980s.  
This approach expanded the goal set beyond the RBA’s legislatively mandated dual 
goals (low inflation and ‘full employment’) to include a policy focus on monetary and 
credit aggregates, interest rates, the exchange rate, and the current account.  Here was 
technical and goal ambiguity writ large.  It was painfully clear that both the 
government and the RBA were uncertain how to proceed.  Transparency was limited 
and accountability became all but impossible.  As the journalist, Paul Kelly, writes: 
‘Monetary policy management in the mid-1980s became an exercise in chaos 
management’.29  Moreover, by this stage official short term interest rate adjustments 
by the authorities had become the main instrument of monetary policy, but policy 
adjustments were not publicly announced.  This lack of transparency, combined with 
the lack of goal and policy accountability reached a high point in the late 1980s 
economic and asset price boom.  A series of sharp interest rate increases occurred, but 
for many months the government denied (for electoral and other reasons) that the 
Bank was lifting interest rates.  
 
It is also true that the Bank was not at all keen to telegraph its policy because 
it was groping along in a fog of uncertainty and was looking for cues from the 
markets and indications about how lenders and borrowers would respond to rate 
changes.  This was emblematic of paradigmatic ambiguity.  As the economist, Barry 
Hughes, argues: ‘The Bank carried some very heavy baggage from the earlier days of 
quasi-monetarism and commitments to free markets.  The rhetoric about setting 
quantities and letting markets look after prices remained….  This is one reason why 
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the Bank made such heavy weather of admitting its cash rate decisions in the later 
1980s.  Setting a price stood out like an ugly outcrop in a sea of free markets’.30  Bob 
Johnston, the RBA’s Governor at the time, concurs:  
I have to take a lot of the responsibility. I wasn’t advocating a 
public explanation of the tightening of interest rates.  I was 
beguiled by the view of allowing markets to have more say in 
what happened and I was really urging the markets to tell us what 
they thought should happen with interest rates…But the markets 
had gone to water and they were looking for leadership.  In 
hindsight I should have been open and bolder and said we were 
putting rates up.31  
 
Johnston now considers the Bank was ‘pretty foolish’ but argues it was in a 
new, post deregulatory environment ‘without much to go on’.32 The RBA was 
fumbling its way through the new financial landscape whilst simultaneously 
attempting to maintain its credibility. Predictably, perhaps,, the inability to be 
completely open about the new situation, which was characterised by uncertainty and 
misunderstanding, led to policy mistakes and economic crises. 
 
The subsequent monetary policy-induced recession of the early 1990s was 
such a blunder.  The authorities had predicted a ‘soft landing’.  Goal ambiguity was 
apparent during the recession.  Critics claimed the RBA’s formal dual goal mandate 
was ambiguous and that the legislation should be altered to help focus the Bank on 
controlling inflation and to improve accountability.  The conservative opposition 
parties ran on this agenda in the 1993 federal election campaign but were defeated.  
The Bank’s leaders, especially its Governor, Bernie Fraser, defended goal dualism.  
Fraser, a partial monetary dove, valued the employment goal as he thought that it 
helped boost the Bank’s legitimacy in the wider community.   Nevertheless, in the 
teeth of the recession, the Bank decided to keep interest rates higher for longer in 
order to crack inflation.  The Bank had been quietly working on a new policy 
framework that amounted to a de facto prioritisation of the inflation goal.  The new 
‘inflation targeting’ framework had been debated within the cloistered confines of the 
Bank from around 1989, but the first hint of the new framework was not publicly 
announced until 1993, and was not fully articulated until the mid 1990s.  Hence, 
neither the new policy framework nor the decision to crack inflation were publicly 
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debated: the political heat and policy uncertainty surrounding both of these moves 
(especially during but even after the recession) meant that the RBA’s leaders had 
strong institutional incentives not to declare their hand.  Revealingly, then, public 
acknowledgement of the monetary policy agenda was always post-facto.  Only after a 
particular approach had been tested and evaluated was the RBA willing to discuss it 
publicly.  Hence, transparency and accountability were attenuated and tended to occur 
only after a significant time lag. 
 
Since, the mid-1990s there have been improvements in the Bank’s 
transparency and accountability as monetary policy (for a time at least) entered calmer 
waters.  The Bank’s inflation targeting framework has been more clearly articulated 
since the mid to late 1990s and the target inflation range has consistently been 
achieved, thus aiding accountability.   
 
However, a new challenge of ‘excessive’ credit growth and asset inflation in 
recent years now confronts the RBA.  The dilemma is that with CPI inflation rates 
continuing to run at historical lows, the Bank has no clear justification (within the 
current policy paradigm) for raising interest rates.  Hence, despite legitimate concerns 
about potential sources of instability, the RBA cannot openly use interest rates to 
discourage speculation in the housing market or make excess borrowing less 
attractive, for fear of a political backlash from government, business and the wider 
public.  Indeed, the Howard government has made it clear it rejects any such approach 
from the Bank.   Nonetheless, the Bank has pushed ahead with targeting asset price 
inflation and credit growth as part of recent rate rises.33    Consequently, amidst such 
moves, the Bank has talked vaguely about extending the ‘flexibility’ and time frame 
of its already flexible inflation targeting regime.  Some of its senior economists have 
hinted at a ‘subtle change in the monetary policy paradigm’,34 but the Bank admits it 
has a ‘communications problem’ in this arena.35 
 
If the RBA is being coy about detailing its apparently modified approach, the 
source of the Bank’s ‘communication’ difficulties are obvious.  The Bank wishes to 
cautiously press ahead with its modified framework, engage in an ongoing policy 
learning process and assess progress in the new terrain it has mapped for itself.  This 
approach is almost exactly analogous to the modus operandi the Bank used when it 
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(vaguely) introduced its original inflation targeting framework in 1993.  Quite 
independently of the government (then and now), the Bank is cautiously and subtlety 
putting out its message, slowly changing its rhetoric and assessing and testing as it 
goes.  The main problem at present for the Bank is that it confronts palpable 
difficulties in constructing, and, (partly for political reasons) in publicly articulating 
its modified framework.  Thus, unless we recognise that the RBA  - and central bakers 
elsewhere, for that matter – confront a rapidly evolving, uncharted economic 
landscape in which they feel obliged to develop a new approach to policy-making we 
will not be able to understand why policy transparency and accountability have been 
necessary casualties.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Independent central banks have risen to prominence as a consequence of changes 
in the international political-economy and a belief that their technical competence 
makes them uniquely equipped to deal - in a disinterested way - with the problems 
such changes generate. And yet, the dynamic, inherently uncertain nature of the 
financial  system means that the delegated power that is central to the operation of 
agencies like the RBA may not specifically authorize ad hoc and covert trial and error 
responses to emerging or novel problems. This highlights the dilemmas faced by 
technocrats and politicians alike, for as Majone observes: 
 
An important characteristic of independent agencies is the limited scope of their 
competences. A strict commitment to specific policy objectives is necessary in 
order to enforce accountability by results, which is one of the main sources of 
legitimation for non-majoritarian institutions.36 
 
But the unforeseen challenges thrown up by the evolving international and domestic 
monetary orders have encouraged the RBA to embark on new, unauthorized policy 
adventures, which go beyond its original mandate, and which are driven by its reading 
of economic trends and dangers. Given that the initial rationale for central bank 
independence was its supposedly superior technical competence, it will be difficult for 
governments - democratically elected or not – to rein in central banks’ steady mission 
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adventurism without looking partisan or unsettling skittish financial markets.  This is 
an issue with wider ramifications as central bankers in Europe, North America and 
Asia are wrestling with similar difficulties as they seek to navigate their way through 
a rapidly evolving international economic order, maintain their credibility, and 
accommodate the differing demands of governments, markets and a disconnected 
public.37 Given that the uncertain nature of the problems that central banks seek to 
manage makes non-transparency and various forms of ambiguity a seemingly 
essential part of their evolving modus operandi, and given the specialist, technocratic 
nature of central bank activities, then the possibility that effective democratic 
accountability and control will be maintained look remote. 
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